Per Ahlmark, a former deputy prime minister of Sweden, argues that Hans Blix is not up to the job of directing a weapons inspection program in Iraq having already demonstrated himself unfit for the task:
The turning point came when Kay initiated inspections of suspect buildings without notifying the Iraqis about his intentions in advance. This new, aggressive inspection strategy had dramatic consequences: Kay discovered material which confirmed that Iraq was only 12 to 18 months away from producing a nuclear device.
This historic discovery ended up in a confrontation at a parking lot in Baghdad. U.N. cars were surrounded by 200 Iraqi soldiers and a mob, ordered out to the scene by Iraqi officials. For four days and nights the siege continued, as Kay and his colleagues used satellite telephones to fax crucial documents to the West.
Blix had opposed the raid. Fortunately, Ambassador Ekeus backed it and supported the inspectors during the siege. I have met a number of experts on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and they often compare the two Swedes: "Ekeus is brilliant," they say, "Blix is terrible."
You can also find the same article here.
|Share |||By Randall Parker at 2002 November 02 09:33 PM Inspections and Sanctions|