Richard Spertzel, former chief biological weapons inspector for the UN in Iraq, discusses the problems the old UNSCOM inspection program had in dealing with the Iraqi regime:
Iraq's multiple so-called "Full, Final, and Complete Declarations" that it had disclosed everything about its prohibited biological weapons program have never been accurate or complete. Nothing appears to have changed Iraq's willingness to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction. Nor does it appear, in spite of the lip service given to getting inspectors back into Iraq, that there has been any significant change in the support that an inspection regime might expect from U.N. Security Council members. The existing resolutions also existed in 1997 and 1998 and failed to get Iraq's full cooperation, in part thanks to Russia's and France's support for whatever Iraq wanted.
So the same governments that do not want the US to attack Iraq also contributed to the failure of inspections as a way to prevent Iraq from developing WMD. Why should we respect their opinions at this point?
|Share |||By Randall Parker at 2002 September 26 12:59 AM Inspections and Sanctions|